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    李振龙, 钱海峰, 刘喆. 交叉口处驾驶员排队与插队的演化博弈分析[J]. 北京工业大学学报, 2010, 36(1): 46-50.
    引用本文: 李振龙, 钱海峰, 刘喆. 交叉口处驾驶员排队与插队的演化博弈分析[J]. 北京工业大学学报, 2010, 36(1): 46-50.
    shu
    LI Zhen-long, QIAN Hai-feng, LIU Zhe. An Analysis on Queuing and Queue-jumping of Drivers at the Intersection Based on the Evolutionary Game[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Technology, 2010, 36(1): 46-50.
    Citation: LI Zhen-long, QIAN Hai-feng, LIU Zhe. An Analysis on Queuing and Queue-jumping of Drivers at the Intersection Based on the Evolutionary Game[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Technology, 2010, 36(1): 46-50.
    shu

    交叉口处驾驶员排队与插队的演化博弈分析

    An Analysis on Queuing and Queue-jumping of Drivers at the Intersection Based on the Evolutionary Game

      摘要
    • 摘要: 针对驾驶员在交叉口处的插队行为,建立了交叉口处驾驶员排队与插队的决策博弈模型.应用演化博弈论分析了驾驶员排队与插队2种策略选择的时间演化过程,建立了系统的复制动态方程并对演化稳定状态进行了分析.结果表明,当交管部门及时发现违章插队的驾驶员并进行处罚时,驾驶员排队的盈利大于其违章插队的盈利,选择排队策略是系统的演化稳定状态.

       

      Abstract: Decision-making model of queuing and queue-jumping of drivers at intersections is proposed concerning the behavior of queue-jumping.The evolutionary process that drivers choose strategies of queuing and queue-jumping is analyzed using evolutionary game theory.A duplicative dynamic equation is established and evolutionary stable state is analyzed.The results show that the payoff of queuing drivers is larger than that of queue-jumping drivers when the queue-jumping drivers of violating regulations can be timely found and punished by the traffic management department.The strategy of queuing is the evolutionary stable state.

       

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