姬韫滔. 贸易壁垒政策的国家间博弈问题探讨[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2003, 3(2): 46-48,53.
    引用本文: 姬韫滔. 贸易壁垒政策的国家间博弈问题探讨[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2003, 3(2): 46-48,53.
    JI Yun-tao. Discussion on the Game Problem Among the Countries Practicing Trade Barrier Policy[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2003, 3(2): 46-48,53.
    Citation: JI Yun-tao. Discussion on the Game Problem Among the Countries Practicing Trade Barrier Policy[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2003, 3(2): 46-48,53.

    贸易壁垒政策的国家间博弈问题探讨

    Discussion on the Game Problem Among the Countries Practicing Trade Barrier Policy

    • 摘要: 运用非合作博弈模型讨论了贸易壁垒政策的国家间博奕问题,论述了单个和多个国家贸易政策的决定,探讨了关税和非关税壁垒两种贸易壁垒政策,认为关税壁垒政策的国家间博弈以名义关税税率的变动值作为博弈时彼此的支付,其支付值的大小取决于产业发展的具体情况,指出在非关税壁垒政策的国家间博弈主动掌握在技术领先一方的情况下,贸易壁垒为一个变动的概念。

       

      Abstract: The game model is used to discuss the game problem among the countries practicing trade barrier policy, elaborate the decision of trade policy of single country and multicountries and explore the two trade barrier policies of tariff and nontarriff. This paper thinks that in the countries practicing tarriff barrier policy the change value of nominal tarriff rate is taken as the mutual payment, the value of which depends upon the development of enterprise; In the nontarriff barrier countries, when the leverage of game is controlled by the superior side in technology, the trade barrier is a variable concept.

       

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