阮平南, 张光莹. 技术创新合作中机会主义治理机制研究[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2015, 15(2): 6-12.
    引用本文: 阮平南, 张光莹. 技术创新合作中机会主义治理机制研究[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2015, 15(2): 6-12.
    RUAN Ping-nan, ZHANG Guang-ying. Research on Governance Mechanism for Opportunistic Behavior in the Technology Innovation Cooperation[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2015, 15(2): 6-12.
    Citation: RUAN Ping-nan, ZHANG Guang-ying. Research on Governance Mechanism for Opportunistic Behavior in the Technology Innovation Cooperation[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2015, 15(2): 6-12.

    技术创新合作中机会主义治理机制研究

    Research on Governance Mechanism for Opportunistic Behavior in the Technology Innovation Cooperation

    • 摘要: 为了降低技术创新网络成员采取机会主义行为的可能性,运用演化博弈方法分析在分配机制和监督机制下技术创新合作中机会主义的演化路径,并分析了在分配机制下是否存在最优的分配系数使得合作企业采取机会主义策略的可能性最小,讨论了是否惩罚成本越高网络成员合作效率越高。研究发现:利益分配系数在一定值时,可以使得合作企业采取机会主义策略的可能性最小;惩罚成本C在达到一定值时,可以使得企业合作的概率最高。

       

      Abstract: In order to reduce the possibility of technological innovation network members taking opportunism behaviors,this article analyzes the opportunistic situation in the technology innovation cooperation based on the evolutionary game theory and further analyzes the optimal allocation coefficient in the allocation mechanism.It is analyzed whether there is the optimal allocation coefficient which could make the enterprises cooperate with each other most likely and discuss whether the higher the punishment is,the higher the efficiency of the network cooperation is.The study demonstrates that if the profit distribution coefficient can achieve a certain value,the enterprises will have the least possibility to adopt the opportunistic strategy.And when the punishment cost reaches a certain value,the enterprises will have the highest probability to adopt the cooperative strategy.

       

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