“准街头官僚”的失范与治理——以城管部门协管员为例

    Anomie and Governance of the Quasi-street-level Bureaucracy:Based on the Investigation of the City Regulation Assistants

    • 摘要: 针对既往“街头官僚”研究忽略了协管员、临时工这一在政府部门大量存在的“准街头官僚”群体问题,指出城管协管员在为城市管理作出贡献的同时,其表现出的以权谋私、妨碍执法及抢夺权威等失范行为,对城市治理、队伍建设和政府形象产生了恶劣影响,亟须治理。然而,由于事权配置失衡,基层治理资源匮乏,协管员身份等因素,使得协管员治理陷入“既离不开又难以有效管理”的“投鼠忌器”式两难困境。认为基层政府应致力于培育正规力量,在协管员等“准街头官僚”群体的报酬上引入市场激励机制,并明确和加强一线执法队员和协管员间的连带责任。

       

      Abstract: The street-level bureaucracy researches ignore the assistants (xie guan yuan) group who are in almost every government departments in China, which can be called quasi-street-level bureaucracy. The urban-management assistants' anomie behaviors such as seeking personal gain, impeding law enforcement robbing formal authority have made a very bad influence on city regulatory, team construction and the government image. In the past decade, the local governments and the street-level bureaucracy individuals have made great efforts and try in the governance of the quasi-street-level bureaucracy, however, due to the urban-management multifarious affairs, formal staff and grassroots governance resources are scarce, the governance of xie guan yuan falls into the dilemma of "throwing sth. at a rat, but being afraid to break the vase" because they are both necessary and difficult to manage. The local government should focus on cultivating normal power and introduce market incentive mechanism in the reward of "quasi street bureaucrats" (xie guan yuan) groups, and strengthen the joint liability between the front-line law enforcement and xie guan yuan.

       

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