复杂经济环境下货币政策调控与银行风险承担能力研究

    Monetary Policy Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking Capacity Under Complex Economic Environment

    • 摘要: 通过构建市场竞争、货币政策和银行风险承担的理论模型,对中国124家银行2007—2020年非平衡面板数据进行实证检验。研究结果表明,随着市场竞争的日益加剧,货币政策调控对银行风险承担效应相应强化,货币政策变动对银行风险承担水平具有放大效应;数量型货币政策工具变动对银行风险承担水平具有显著的“加力”效应,价格型货币政策工具变动对银行风险承担水平具有温和的“弹性”效应。稳健性检验发现,在利率期限差异下不同资产规模的银行中,总量性货币政策变动对银行风险承担水平存在异质性特征;结构性货币政策工具对银行风险承担水平具有较为显著的引导性影响。因此,货币政策调控要在总量上保持流动性合理充裕,遏制市场竞争加剧下银行风险承担水平上升,运用期限结构货币政策工具引导资金流向,逐步优化经济结构,运用创新性货币政策工具对实体经济精准滴灌,助力“专精特新”企业发展,加大对科技创新和绿色发展的支持,维持宏观经济稳定发展。

       

      Abstract: Through constructing theoretical models of market competition, monetary policy and bank risk-taking, this paper empirically tests the unbalanced panel data of 124 Chinese banks from 2007 to 2020. The results show that with the increasing market competition, the effect of monetary policy regulation on bank risk-taking is gradually strengthened, and the change of monetary policy has a magnifying effect on bank risk-taking level. Quantitative monetary policy instrument changes have a significant "booster" effect on bank risk-taking level, while price monetary policy instrument changes have a mild "elastic" effect on bank risk-taking level. The robustness test shows that the aggregate monetary policy changes have heterogeneous characteristics on the risk taking level of banks with different interest rate maturities and different asset sizes. Structural monetary policy instruments have a significant guiding influence on the level of bank risk-taking. In the monetary policy, therefore, the reasonable abundant liquidity should be guaranteed for the total money supply, while the fast increase in bank risk bearing level be under control in serious competition; the term structure of monetary policy tools is used to guide the capital flow for improving the market structure; the innovative monetary policy tools are used for precision financing to new, small-sized, innovation-type and green businesses in the real economy for maintaining a stable macroeconomic development.

       

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