Abstract: The choice of environmental regulation strategy for pollution control in the Yellow River basin is the key problem to promote the coordinated control of the Yellow River basin. This paper constructs the evolutionary game model of the central government, local government and polluting enterprises, and explores the evolution of environmental regulation strategies of all parties through numerical simulation. It further introduces the reputation loss model of public participation, and discusses the game strategy selection of environmental regulation of the three parties under public participation. The results show that: when the central government chooses loose regulation, the local government chooses to implement environmental regulation, and the enterprises choose to treat pollution, the three parties can achieve the ideal evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the behavior strategy choice of each subject is only affected by the parameters in the stability condition, not by the selection probability of each subject. The public participation can promote the enterprises to evolve to the pollution control state at a faster speed, and make the ideal evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium arrive ahead of time. In order to strengthen the effect of environmental regulation policy on pollution control in the Yellow River basin, policy suggestions are put forward: firstly, improve the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government for local governments along the Yellow River basin. Secondly, strengthen the environmental protection responsibility of local governments along the Yellow River basin. Thirdly, implement the main responsibility of pollution control of polluting enterprises in cities along the Yellow River basin.