村庄经营者与“钓鱼”经营:项目进村背景下的村干部——以华北P县西水村为例

    Village Manager and "Fishing" Strategy: Village Cadres in the Context of Project in Villages——A Case Study of Xishui Village

    • 摘要: 在项目进村和乡村振兴战略背景下,随着惠农项目逐渐增多,政府资源大量投入农村,政府与村庄、村干部的关系发生变化,村干部的角色和行为特征也发生变化。以华北地区一个村庄为例,讨论国家项目进入村庄之后引发的双重效应:项目作为国家政权力量向乡村渗透的一种手段,同时也激发了一批农村精英投入到乡村建设中来。聚焦于新时代村干部的角色讨论,认为在项目进村的背景下,乡村精英成为“村庄经营者”,他们采取“钓鱼”经营方式从政府拿到项目,并试图打通政府支持与村民信任之间的联系,让以往被视为只能二选一的“获得政府资源”和“获得村民信任”两个目标间形成良性循环,从而实现自己的治理目标。力图分析概括这类村干部的行为特征和身份特点,并反思项目进村对村庄的影响。

       

      Abstract: In the context of the strategy of rural revitalization, a lot of resources are invested into rural areas, while the relationship between the government, village and village cadres has been changed, so as to the role and behavior characteristics of village cadres. Taking a village in North China as an example, this paper discusses the dual effects of the national project after entering into village: on the one hand, it is a means of infiltrating the state power into the village, on the other hand, it stimulates a group of rural elites to devote themselves into rural construction. This paper argues that the rural elites become "village managers" in the context of project entering the village. They take the "fishing" strategy to get more projects from governments, and try to get government support and villagers' trust at the same time, so as to form a virtuous circle between the two goals of getting "government resources" and "villagers' trust". This paper attempts to analyze and summarize the behavior and identity characteristics of this kind of village cadres, and reflect on the impact of project in villages.

       

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